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NEW TRENDS IN EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE
OF PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
The nation's parochial schools face an economic crisis that severely
threatens their continued operation.: Recent Supreme Court decisions
barring public aid to parochial schools have exacerbated that crisis.
Moreover, the very structure of our educational system is the subject of
increasing criticism, with many critics proposing radical innovation.
These developments may drastically affect the role of private and
parochial schools in our evolving educational system.
Conflict between public aid to parochial schools 2 and the constitutional barrier between church and state has generated continuous discussion. The social and economic aspects of the controversy, which are
entwined with the constitutional issues, contribute to the debate. The
issue is urgently in need of resolution today. President Nixon has suggested that the demise of all private schools would cost United States
I "Private" schools, in effect, refers to Catholic schools since they enroll nearly 11%
of the American elementary and secondary school population (Friedman & Bintzen,
Politics and Parochaid,Tim NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1971, at 13), while all private schools
account for only 12.3%. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1971, at 103 (1971).
2 See Friedman & Bintzen, supra note 1, at 12.

8 A report of the National Catholic Educational Association indicates that the annual
cost of operating parochial schools has increased by $200 million in the last three years,
while the number of Catholic schools has decreased by 7% and enrollment has decreased
by 10%. Exemplifying this financial crisis is the recent announcement that 10 parochial
schools in Buffalo would be dosed. Currivan, Catholic Schools Down 7% Since '67, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 13, 1970, at 60, col. 1.
A variety of factors has contributed to the financial dilemma of the parochial schools.
Among these are a steady decline in enrollment, a startling decrease in the number of
religious teachers (and a corresponding increase in the number of lay teachers who must
be paid salaries commensurate with those offered in the public school system), and insufficient contributions from the Catholic laity. See E. BARTELL, CoSrs AND BENEFITS OF
CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY ScHOoLs 255-85 (1969); C. KooB & R. SHAw, S.OS.
FOR CATHOLIC SCHOOLs: A STRATEGY FOR FUTURE SERVICE TO CHURCH AND NATION 61-69

(1970); New York State Council of Catholic School Superintendents, Another Aspect of the
Financial Crisis in Education: The Current Problem of Support for the Education of
Catholic Elementary and Secondary School Children, 16 CATH. LAw. 15 (1970); see also
note 41 infra.
In addition to the current financial crisis, Catholic schools are experiencing other
problems. See TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CATHOLIC EDUCATION (R. Hurley & R. Shaw eds. 1969);
Huth, Catholic Education: To Be or Not To Be?, 97 SCHOOL & SOCIEry 101 (1969). Some

current attitudes signify a marked shift from the status once enjoyed by Catholic schools:
Not many years ago, the question that is now being asked-whether Catholic
schools have a future-would have been unthinkable. Catholic schools occupied
the same impregnable position as fish on Friday and the Latin Mass.
C. KooB & 1. SHAw, supra at 127.
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citizens more than $4 billion annually in operating expenditures and
4
an additional $5 billion for new educational facilities.
Many state legislatures have enacted or proposed legislation which
would extend public aid in some form to parochial schools.5 The
federal government has also taken steps to ascertain the most appropriate manner in which to give some support to private schools.6 Opponents of such aid, however, argue that it is unconstitutional and that
the needs of the public schools demand the immediate and primary
attention of government at all levels. The Supreme Court has recently
provided some guidance on the legal issues of the controversy by strik4 EducationalReform, 6 Wamry CoMP. PRFES.
Docs. 304, 812 (March 8, 1970).
5 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 10-281a to -281v (Supp. 1971); Omo REV. CODE
ANN. § 3317.06(H) (Page 1971); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971); RI. GEN.
LAWS ANN. §§ 16-51-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970). But see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
(Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes ruled unconstitutional).

For a summary of some of the recent proposals, see Cohen, PublicAid to Non-Public
Schools in 1969, 98 SCHOOL & SociErry 300 (1970). See also CENTR FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC
POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS: A REPORT ON FINANCING ELEMENTARY EDUCATION By GRANTS
to PARENTS 817-89 (1970) (app. E) [hereinafter cited as EDUCATION VOUCHERS].

Public aid is intended to save the parochial schools from possible extinction and to
spare the public schools the financial burden that would be thrust upon them in the
event the private school system failed. Difficulties arise, however, with respect to the form
such aid should take. The New York State Education Department made a study of the
possible forms of aid and developed six proposals, varying from extension of textbook aid
to direct financial assistance. Cohen, supra at 801. Although Governor Rockefeller has
recognized that the cost of extending aid to private schools would be far less than the
expense involved in transferring the private school enrollment to public schools, political
and legal considerations have prevented affirmative action. See Lynn, Religious Schools
Win Pledge of Aid from Governor Rockefeller: Reversed Stand is Indicated By Promise
to Help Solve Fiscal Crisis,N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1971, at 1, col. 6; Lynn, ParochialSchools:
A Dispute with a New Twist Almost Every Day, id, Feb. 28, 1971, § 4, at 8, col. 1; c.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Rockefeller, 322 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
For an argument that Connecticut's Nonpublic Secular Education Act was intended
not only to relieve some of the financial burdens of private schools, but also to enable
the state to gain greater control over education in the private sector, see Note, Aid to
Nonpublic Schools: The Power of the Purse in Public Act 791, 2 CONN. L. REv. 427 (1969).
6 Partly in recognition of the special problems which beset parochial schools, the
President has appointed a special commission to study school finances. Friedman & Bintzen,
supra note 1.
Furthermore, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 US.C.
§§ 236-44 (1970)) is applicable to private as well as public schools. Under this legislation,
private schools may participate in certain programs which afford aid to deprived children.
The participation of parochial schools has been challenged as a violation of first amendment guarantees of separation of church and state. See D'Alessio, ESEA and the Nonpublic
School Administrator,in TRENDS AND ISSUES IN CATHOLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 197;
La Noue, Church-State Problems in New Jersey: The Implementation of Title I (ESEA)
in Sixty Cities, 22 RuTGERs L. REv. 219 (1968); Comment, The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act-The Implications of the Trust-Fund Theory for the Church-State Questions Raised by Title I, 65 MIcH. I. REv. 1184 (1967).
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ing down the ambitious aid programs of Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island.7
I
PUBLIC AmD TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS AND THE CONSTITUTION

A.

General ConstitutionalDoctrine
Language in early Supreme Court cases seemed to indicate that
any government involvement in religious affairs was strictly prohibited
as violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment.8 In
Everson v. Board of Education,9 however, the Court, while repeating
the "no-aid-to-religion" language, 0 upheld a program under which the
government paid the costs of transporting both public and private
school students. The Court reasoned that the program was enacted for
the general welfare, analogized it to other governmental services such
as police and fire protection," and concluded that students attending
sectarian schools could not be deprived of the benefits of such a program.' 2 The primary effect of the aid was to benefit parochial school
students and their parents, and any benefit derived by the institution
was incidental.'"
7 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1939); Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S.
50, 79 (1907); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
9 380 U.S. 1 (1947).
10 The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least
this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another.... Neither a state nor the Federal government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa.
In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect a "wall of separation between church and State."
Id. at 15-16, quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
11 Id. at 17-18.
12 Thus, it seemed that the Court was invoking the free exercise clause to sustain
the legislation, rather than rigidly examining the enactment in order to determine if it
met the standards of the establishment clause. See Note, The New York and Federal Constitutional Standards in Relation to Government Aid to Private Education, 18 BUFFALo L.
REv. 526, 532 (1969).
13 This approach has been referred to as the "child benefit" theory. It is questionable
whether direct aid to the child is not "support" of the parochial school, at least in an
economic sense:

If subsidies are granted to pupils for purposes such as non-religious education
services not already being provided by the Catholic schools, e.g., for transportation
or for textbooks, the assumed improvement in quality of the secular component
of the Catholic education is likely to accentuate the influence of income effects
in the determination of equilibrium levels of school activity by ecclesiastical

decision-makers. ...

Thus, the voluntary character of financial support of all
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In School Districtv. Schempp,14 the Court stressed the necessity of
government neutrality: "[T]here must be a secular legislative purpose
and primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."'" This
new test was applied by the Court in Board of Education v. Allen. 1 In
Allen, the Court examined the validity of a New York statute which
required school districts to purchase and loan textbooks to private as
well as public school students. In spite of the secular nature of textbooks, especially as they might be used in the classroom, they are not so
obviously neutral as bus transportation; nevertheless the Court held
7
the statute constitutional based upon the dual test of Schempp.'
Constitutional doctrine in this area was further clarified in Walz
v. Tax Commission 8 where the Court approved tax exemptions given to
church owned property. Finding that "[t]he legislative purpose of the
property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor inhibition of
religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility,"' 1 the Court implied
that the first part of the Schempp test had been met. 'the opinion, however, emphasized for the first time the additional need to avoid "excessive entanglement" 20 of the state in church affairs. This requirement
Church activities may bring about the paradoxical effect that state aid to the
individual results in greater financial aid to religious activities than certain forms

of restricted subsidies made directly to the Catholic schools.
E. BAR=F , supra note 3, at 278-79.
14 374 US. 203 (1963).
15 Id. at 222.
This was not a neutrality, however, that would prohibit government from any
activity that might inhibit or advance religion. See P. KuoLAM, RruGIoN AND THE LAw 18
(1962). Such an interpretation would not be compatible with the Court's decision in

Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), where it held that a state system of "released time"
that allowed public school children to attend religious instruction during school hours
but off the school premises was constitutionally permissible. See notes 90-91 and accompanying text infra. The Court ruled that the state may accommodate its school program to serve religious needs. See also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Valente,
Aid to Church Related Education-New Directions Without Dogma, 55 VA. L. Rv. 579,
585-94 (1969).
16 392 U.S. 286 (1968).
17 The law was found to have "a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that

neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. at 243, quoting School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 222 (1963). "Although the books loaned are those required by the parochial

school for use in specific courses, each book loaned must be approved by the public school
authorities; only secular books may receive approval." Id. at 244-45. Cf. note 84 and accompanying text infra.
18 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
19 Id. at 672.
20 The court believed that the government's activity in administering taxes would

involve excessive entanglement.
Determining that the legislative purpose of tax exemption is not aimed at
establishing, sponsoring, or supporting religion does not end the inquiry, however.
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initially appeared to be merely a modification of the "primary effect"
part of the Schempp test. 21 The Court in Walz reiterated the difficulties
involved in defining the boundaries of the establishment clause:
Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must... turn
on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish
or interfere 22with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect
of doing so.
B.

The "Purchase-of-Secular-Services" Cases
In response to the financial dilemma faced by parochial schools,
many states enacted "purchase-of-secular-services" legislation.2 3 This
approach was designed to take advantage of the secular-sectarian distinction of Everson and Allen. Typical of these statutes were those enacted
by Pennsylvania and Rhode Island which were successfully challenged
24
in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
The Pennsylvania statute authorized the Superintendent of Public
Instruction to purchase specified secular educational services for nonpublic schools. 25 The state would reimburse nonpublic schools for
teachers' salaries, textbooks, and materials for secular subjects. The
Rhode Island act authorized the payment of a fifteen percent salary
supplement to teachers in nonpublic schools where the average per
pupil expenditure was below the public school average. 26 To qualify for
We must also be sure that the end result-the effect-is not an excessive govern-

ment entanglement with religion.
Id at 674. See text accompanying notes 81-84 infra.
The line between constitutionally permissible and prohibited entanglements is
"inescapably one of degree." 397 U.S. at 674.
21 Lower court cases decided after Walz seemed to treat the entanglement standard
as a clarification of the primary effect test. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious
Liberty v. Rockefeller, 822 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp.
421 (D. Conn. 1970), aff'd, 403 U.S. 955 (1971); DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112
(D.R.I. 1970), aff'd sub nom. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Court's decision
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). however, indicated that the entanglement test
is separate from the primary effect test. See note 31 and accompanying text infra. That
decision did not, however, fully clarify the issue, which remains confused. See generally
Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development: Part II.
The Nonestablishment Principle,81 HARv. L. Rv. 513 (1968).
22

397 U.S. at 669. For a comprehensive discussion of the effects of the Walz decision,

see Kauper, The Walz Decision: More on the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment,

69 MicH. L. REy. 179 (1970).
23 See note 5 supra.
24 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

See also Johnson v. Sanders, 319 F. Supp. 421 (D. Conn. 1970),
afl'd, 403 U.S. 955 (1971); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Rockefeller, 322
F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
25 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-09 (Supp. 1971). The act covered four secular
subjects: physical sciences, physical education, modem foreign languages, and mathematics.
26 RJ. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-51-1 to -9 (Supp. 1970).
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the supplement, the teacher had to teach only those courses offered in
the public schools.2 7 The Rhode Island statute had been held unconstitutional by the district court on the ground that it fostered excessive
government entanglement with religious affairs. 28 The Pennsylvania
29
statute, however, had been upheld.
The Supreme Court found both statutes unconstitutional in a
decision which will have an enormous effect on the future of parochial
education. 30 The Court treated the Walz "entanglement" standard
separately from the traditional "purpose and primary effect" test, thus
creating a third test out of what appeared in Walz to be merely a refinement of the Schempp formula.3 1 Both statutes were able to meet the
secular purpose part of the test, since the stated legislative purpose was
to enhance the quality of secular education in all schools.8 2 Consideration of the primary effect part of the test was not necessary, however,
as the statutes were found to involve excessive entanglement.38
With respect to the Rhode Island program, the Court recognized
the difficulties in separating the secular and sectarian content of a
particular course of instruction: "In terms of potential for involving
some aspect of faith or morals in secular subjects, a textbook's content
is ascertainable, but a teacher's handling of a subject is not."' 4 The state
27 Any teacher who applied for a salary supplement was required to sign a statement not to teach a course in religion during any period in which such supplements were
received. R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-51-3 (Supp. 1970). See note 35 infra.
28 "Walz thus makes it clear that the test of a statute's effect is . ..whether the
degree of entanglement required by the statute is likely to promote the substantive evils
against which the First Amendment guards." DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112,
120 (D.R.L 1970).
29 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
30 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
81 Id. at 612-13. See note 21 supra. By virtue of Lemon the establishment test now
requires that the statute have a secular purpose, a primary effect that neither advances
nor inhibits religion, and that it must not foster excessive government entanglement.
82 Id. at 612. The Court has traditionally been willing to accept the purpose as
stated in the enabling legislation. See Valente, supra note 15, at 596-97.
83 403 Us. at 613-14.
84 Id. at 617. Continuing, the Court stated:
We cannot ignore the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses to the separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects
of pre-college education. The conflict of functions inheres in the situation.
Id.
It is curious to note that in a case decided the same day, Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971), the Supreme Court held that the use of Title I funds under the Higher
Education Facilities Act of 1963 (20 US.C. §§ 701-25, 751-58 (1970)) for church related
colleges was not unconstitutional. The case was distinguished from Lemon on the ground
that religious indoctrination is not a substantial purpose or activity in church related
colleges. Moreover, the aid involved in Tilton was a one-time, single purpose construction
grant. 403 U.S. at 684-90.
Arguments have been made that aid to church related colleges, as distinguished from
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legislature had placed restrictions" on eligibility for aid in order more
reasonably to ensure the maintenance of this separation. The Court
held that the continuing state surveillance that would be necessary to
ensure that the restrictions were obeyed would involve excessive entanglement of church and state. 6
Similar reasoning was used to strike down the Pennsylvania statute.
Disbursement of funds under its provisions would also require pervasive
government surveillance.3 7 Furthermore, unlike the programs upheld in
Everson and Allen, the Pennsylvania statute provided for payment of
money subsidies directly to the church related schools. The hazards 3
of such direct payments had been emphasized in Walz. 9
The majority opinion indicated another base of entanglement in
its decision. Both of these programs would necessarily involve political
divisiveness. 40 Political division along religious lines would violate the
spirit of the first amendment.
These decisions place parochial educational institutions in a precarious financial position. If they are to survive they-and state govern41
ments-must fully explore alternative formulas for public aid.
parochial elementary and secondary schools, involves different legal considerations. The
maturity of college students, as well as the absence of a "close financial, legal, and
pedagogical relationship to the Church," account for this distinction. DiCenso v. Robinson, 316 F. Supp. 112, 122 n.15 (D.R.I. 1970). See also P. KAuPER, RELIGION AND THE
CONS TrTrrON 114-16 (1964).

35 The recipient was required to teach only those courses offered in public schools,
use only texts and materials used in public schools, and-refrain from teaching any course
in religion. RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 16-51-3 (Supp. 1970). See note 27 and accompanying
text supra.

36 403 U.S. at 619. Another area of entanglement involved in the Rhode Island program was isolated by the Court. Since only teachers employed by private schools, where
the average per pupil expenditure on secular education was less than that of public
schools, were eligible for salary supplements, the government would have the burden
of examining the financial records of church related schools to determine allocation of
expenditures between secular and sectarian subjects. Id. at 620.
37 Id. at 620-21.
38 The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that
such programs have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of
control and surveillance.
Id. at 621.
39 Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
40 The potential for political divisiveness related to religious belief and practice
is aggravated in these two statutory programs by the need for continuing annual
appropriations and the likelihood of larger and larger demands as costs and
populations grow.
403 U.S. at 623.
41 Catholic schools have been closing at the rate of one per day. In Pennsylvania,
where it costs approximately $850 a year to educate a child in the public schools,
parochial schools could keep their doors open with $37 per child in state aid. TIME, July
12, 1971, at 32. The complete failure of parochial schools could have crippling effects
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II
ALTERNATIVES FOR PAROCHIAL

SCHOOLS

Dissatisfaction with traditional educational structures has led to
experimentation and innovation in existing systems. Although most
new approaches remain untested in the courts, some may prove to be
constitutionally permissible methods for solving the financial problems
of parochial schools.

A.

Voucher Plans

A family voucher system, in which the parent exercises control in
the selection of a school, is not a new proposal. 43 It has, however,
recently received increased support. 44 Although promulgated in response
to the broader ideological crisis in education, the family voucher program is regarded by many supporters of religious education as a valid
alternative to the demise of their school systems.
Although a great number of voucher programs have been proposed, 45 only one that includes private schools has been set out in
on public education. Whereas recent closings of parochial schools have sent approximately 1.2 million pupils into the public schools, complete failure could place the remaining 4.4 million in public school seats. Id.
42 See notes 92-96 and accompanying text infra.
43 Milton Friedman proposed an unregulated voucher scheme eight years ago.
M. FRIEDmAN, CAPrrALIS AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1963).
44 For a comprehensive discussion of the voucher plan, its implications and administration, see EDUCATION VOUCHEms, reviewed in Ross & Zeckhauser, Book Review, 80 YALE L.J.
451 (1970). See also C. Jencks, Education Vouchers, THE NEw REPUBLIC July 4, 1970, at 19.
The proposal developed by the Center for the Study of Public Policy has received
the approval of the Administration and the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), which
plans to fund an experimental project to determine the effectiveness of such an approach.
James E. Allen, Jr., then United States Commissioner of Education, said in an interview
that "[t]here are pitfalls in this [voucher system] we must try to avoid, but I am supporting the feasibility study on vouchers being financed by the Office of Economic Opportunity." USOE: Plans, Prioritiesfor the 70's, NATION'S ScHooLs, May 1970, at 49, 52.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1970, at 27, col. 1.
45 EDUCATION VoucHMns identifies no less than seven alternative economic models,
ranging from completely unregulated schemes to the highly regulated one supported by
the Administration.
One of these approaches is the "effort voucher," set forth in J. CooNs, W. CLUNIE &
S. SUGAniAN, PRIvATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EDUCATION (1970). Under this model, each school
is categorized into one of four levels of expenditure. Schools at the lowest level of expenditure would be heavily subsidized by the state. The amount contributed by the
parents would be based upon their ability to pay and their choice as to how much of
their income they wished to allocate to education. Theoretically this would eliminate
wealth as a criterion for educational quality. A model statute for California, based upon
this approach, was developed. Id. See also Coons, Clune & Sugarman, Educational Oppor-
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sufficient detail to permit a meaningful analysis of its first amendment
implications. The voucher plan prepared by the Center for the Study of
Public Policy for the Office of Economic Opportunity 40 would call for
the creation of an Educational Voucher Agency (EVA) 47 that would
issue vouchers to every family in its district. The value of the voucher
would approximate the per pupil expenditure of public schools in the
area, with compensatory awards added to vouchers presented to educationally disadvantaged students. The schools receiving the vouchers
48
would then exchange them with the government for operating funds.
For a school to become eligible to cash vouchers, it must satisfy certain
criteria: (1) it must accept the voucher as full payment of tuition; (2) it
must accept any student without regard to race and, in the event there
are more applicants than vacancies, it must admit at least half of the
students by random selection; (3) it must maintain accurate records of
money received and spent; (4) it must make available a wide variety of
information to the public; and (5) it must meet state educational standards.49 This regulated system is intended to provide equal access to
educational resources to advantaged and disadvantaged students and
to comply with the equal education mandates of Brown v. Board of Education.50 It would theoretically provide parents with sufficient information to make an intelligent choice among competing schools, and
provide an incentive for innovation and reform. 5'
tunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures, 57 CALM. L. RM.
305, 321 (1969).

A recent California decision, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal.
Rptr. 601 (1971), gave some indication that an alternative such as the "effort voucher" may
be constitutionally permissible. In Serrano the California Supreme Court held that state
funding of schools through local property taxes violated the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause. The court noted that basing the quality of education on the
wealth of the parent is unwarranted discrimination.
46 EDUCATION Voucsms 13-17.
47 This agency could be elected or appointed. It might be an existing board of
education or a new body with greater or smaller geographic jurisdiction. Id. at 14.
48 The EVA would receive the funds from local, state, and federal governments. Id.
49 This model is a highly regulated and complex system. There remain, however, a
great many more simple variations which may be implemented at the local level. See
Areen, Education Vouchers, 6 HAv. Civ. Ricsss-Crv. Im. L. REv. 466, 474-75 (1971).
50 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51 The voucher system outlined above is quite different from other systems now
being advocated. It regulates the educational marketplace more than most conservatives would like, and contains far more safeguards for the interests of disadvantaged children. We recognize that such restrictions will be considered undesirable by some people. But we believe that a voucher system which does not
include these or equally effective safeguards would be worse than no voucher
system at all. Indeed, an unregulated voucher system could be the most serious
setback for the education of disadvantaged children in the history of the United
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A major objection to a voucher scheme is that, insofar as parochial
schools participate, it would violate the constitutional guarantee of
separation of church and state. Other objections are that it would
legitimize and encourage racial segregation,5 2 that it would result in a
proliferation of profit making organizations, some of questionable quality, competing for student vouchers,53 that it would create difficult
administrative burdens, and that parents are not best qualified to deter54
mine their children's educational needs.
Implementation of the voucher plan might avoid constitutional
infirmity 55 and meet less resistance 56 if parochial schools were eliminated
from participation. This, however, would be inconsistent with the
States. A properly regulated system, on the other hand, could inaugurate a new
era of innovation and reform in American schools.
EDUCATION VoucHMts 17.
52 See McCann &Areen, Vouchers and the Citizen-Some Legal Questions, 72 TEAcmRwS
COLLEGE Rzcoau 389, 391-95 (1971).
53 That each participating school would have to satisfy certain government imposed
criteria (e.g., facilities and faculty), would tend to mitigate the chances that "fly-by-night"
schools would evolve throughout the nation, competing for tuition stipends. See id. at
402-03.
54 See EDUCATION Voucrmts 4-5. See also McCann & Areen, supra note 52, at 402-04;
Reactions to Vouchers: Hostility, Scepticism, NATION'S SCHOOLS, Jan. 1971, at 89.
55 First amendment considerations are not the only potential constitutional barriers

to implementation of tuition voucher experiments. Fourteenth amendment prohibitions
may prove fatal to proposed voucher plans before a consideration of first amendment
guarantees is necessary. For an excellent discussion of the legal questions involved, see
Areen, supra note 49. See also McCann & Areen, supra note 52.
56 A great deal of opposition comes from school administrators and teachers. A
recent poll showed that 80% of school administrators responding expressed strong opposition to the proposed voucher experiment. A similar poll one year earlier had shown 43%
approval whereas only 20% expressed approval in the recent poll). Reactions to Vouchers:
Hostility, Scepticism, supra note 54. The National Parent and Teachers' Association has
voiced similar disapproval of the OEO experiment, contending that it would be detrimental to the public school system. Ryan, Public Aid for Nonpublic Schools? PTA Votes
No, PTA MAGAZINE, Oct. 1970, at 16, 17. See also Jencks Education Plan: Sure To Backfire,
87 CHRiSTIAN CENTURY 1176 (1970); Shanker, The Voucher Plan Strikes a Blow at the Public
Schools, N.Y. Times, July 11, 1971, § 4, at 7, cols. 7-8; Shanker, The Educational Voucher
Idea: A Present Danger, N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, § 4, at 7, col. 6.
Although proponents of various voucher schemes span the political spectrum, support
for the OEO project has come from many who have a direct interest in the preservation
of parochial schools. A Jesuit magazine reported, for example, that "[e]xperiments are
necessary, and Professor Jencks and his associates have designed one of the best we have
seen in a long time." The Jencks Tuition Voucher Plan, 122 AMEIcA 644, 645 (1970).
The United States Chamber of Commerce issued a task force report in 1966 which proposed
a somewhat similar approach to education. Blum, Freedom and Competition, in TRENs
AND ISSUES IN CATHOLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 209. Furthermore, although a conference of Jewish community relations leaders stated its opposition to schemes such as
vouchers, the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, which operates a
growing network of all day schools, dissented from this position. N.Y. Times, June 26,
1971, at 84, cols. 5-7; see also id., May 9, 1971, at 58, cols. 4-8.
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stated purpose of the scheme, that is, to encourage free choice and to
increase competition among all schools in a particular locale. 57 The
Supreme Court's decisions in the "purchase-of-secular-services" cases
do not squarely confront the issues presented by education voucher
schemes. They do, however, provide some insight into the probable
nature of future litigation in this area.
Proponents of parochial school participation in voucher schemes
advance two theories which distinguish these plans from the purchase
of services approach and which, arguably, may surmount constitutional
barriers.5 8 The first view stresses the plan's reliance on individual freedom of choice. 59 Under the plan, vouchers restricted to educational use
would be given to parents who would determine whether to present
these vouchers to a religious or to a secular school. The vouchers
would, in turn, be redeemed by the EVA. Such an administrative
scheme has been analogized to tax deductions for charitable contributions, welfare payments, and veterans' benefits. This approach theo57 The temptation is strong to avoid the issue by excluding parochial schools

entirely from at least the first voucher programs. Yet it is conceptually and constitutionally difficult to justify their exclusion from a plan which is based on the

policy of allowing parents more choice in the education of their children.
Areen, supra note 49, at 492 (footnote omitted). Furthermore, it is highly likely that a
voucher system confined to the public sector would prove far less successful than a complete one. See EDUCATION Voucama 132-36.

One of the praiseworthy attributes of the private school system has been that it
offers an alternative to public school education, thus preserving a degree of free
choice and social pluralism in the academic marketplace and, to a certain extent, fostering
competition to produce a better product. The private schools, however, have not been

competitive, as the costs involved in attending a private school are far above the average
citizen's resources. Other factors which have prevented parochial schools from competing on
an equal level are lack of funds, shortage of qualified educators, and, perhaps, an ideological stance that may be out of step with the educational needs of modern society.

See note 3 supra. Hopefully, a voucher system would create an educational structure in
which competition is extensive. See O'Neill, The ParochialSchool Question, in TRENOs AND
IssuEs IN CATHOLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 36, 46-47.
58 See EDUCATION VouCHES 221-41; Areen, supra note 50, at 492-500; McCann & Areen,
supra note 54, at 395-402.
59 This argument is based largely on the Supreme Court's decision in Quick Bear v.
Leupp, 210 US. 50 (1908). A treaty between the United States and the Sioux Indians
required the federal government to provide funds for each group of 300 Indians who
wished to be educated. Pursuant to this treaty, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs entered
into a contract with the Bureau of Catholic Indian Missions. The Bureau received funds
with which to compensate teachers and maintain facilities in a Catholic school. The Court
held the expenditures constitutional on the grounds that the government merely administered the funds and disposition was determined by the Indians' choice of schools.
60 Veterans are able to use government funds to attend church related schools, presumably because the individual veteran makes the choice as to whom the recipient will
be. 38 U.S.C. § 1670 (1970). Likewise, no restrictions are placed on Social Security or welfare
payments; these also may find their way to church related institutions at the choice of
the recipient.
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retically maintains the government neutrality and lack of entanglement
called for by the first amendment. 61 Any aid to religion would be the
result of a private individual's decision to spend his award on religious
education. The "purchase-of-secular-services" statutes recently struck
down by the Court involved payment of direct money subsidies to
either the religious schools themselves or teachers of secular subjects
in sectarian schools.0 2 Furthermore, those statutes provided for payments only to private schools, whereas a voucher scheme would make
no distinction between private and public school recipients. 3 The
purported purpose of payments directly to parents would be to enhance
the quality of education within the state or area, as it was in the Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes. This purpose should satisfy the
first part of the Schempp test. Unlike the Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island statutes, however, and unlike those approved by the Supreme
Court in Everson and Allen, the support is not confined to secular activities. Thus, the "primary effect" portion of the Schempp test might
constitute a greater barrier to a voucher approach advanced solely under
the freedom of choice rationale than the "excessive entanglement"
standard of Walz, which proved fatal to "purchase-of-secular-services"
legislation. 4
It would be impossible to maintain that the financial aid extended
supports only the secular education functions of the recipient school.0 5
It is arguable that the primary effect of such payments to religious
schools would be, in fact, to advance religion. 8 Considering the Court's
caution in establishing conclusive rules with respect to the establishment clause,6 7 it may be that the mere form of transferring funds to
61 In order for the freedom of choice theory to be persuasive, there must be freedom
of choice in fact as well as theory. In other words, every student in attendance at a church
related school must have access to a secular institution. See EDuCATIoN VoucBERS 229.
62 See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
63 In the voucher system all participating schools would be quasi-public in the
sense that they would be financed by public funds and would be subject to government
imposed regulations.
64 See notes 30-40 and accompanying text supra.
65 The alternative "no prescribed benefit" theory provides a more plausible response
to this argument. See text accompanying notes 69-75 infra.
66 The Court has not made entirely dear the extent of benefit that can be enjoyed
by religious institutions as a result of aid extended for a secular purpose before the
legislation would have a primary effect which advances religion. See notes 13-22 and
accompanying text supra. However, since Lemon illustrates that the surveillance necessary
to ensure that secular courses in nonpublic schools are not permeated with religion would
constitute government entanglement, a voucher program would at least have to avoid
government allocation of funds between secular and sectarian objectives.
87 Even the Court's most recent pronouncement leaves room for a great deal of debate
concerning the constitutional validity of various approaches to parochaid. The Court
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parents before they reach religious institutions could not, in and of
itself, remedy any substantive constitutional defects. 68
A second theory, however, speculates that voucher funds intended
to compensate church schools only for secular instruction would be
constitutionally valid. This is the "no proscribed benefit theory." 69 The
secular purpose test would be satisfied in the same manner as with the
"purchase-of-secular-services" statutes. Unfortunately, the purchase of
services cases provide little guidance regarding the application of the
"primary effect" portion of the first amendment test in this context.7 0
Moreover, the cases that struck down education laws or practices on the
ground that they had a primary religious effect have all involved religious exercises conducted in the public schools.7 1 Because of the hazy
nature of the "primary effect" standard, the issue of whether disbursements earmarked for secular activities in a parochial school will have
a primary effect of aiding religion may in fact be subsumed under the
"entanglement" standard since government efforts would be required
to ensure that funding has been limited to secular activities.7 2 The
voucher plan would fail owing to the inevitable government entanglement with religious institutions inherent in its administration.
There would be no need, however, to make a daily allocation
between secular and sectarian activities if a "no proscribed benefit"
voucher system might proceed under the "secular value" theory.73 In
realized the difficulty in formulating broad principles to deal with such problems: "Candor
compels acknowledgment, moreover, that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
US. 602, 612 (1971).
68 Cf. note 13 supra.
69 See EDUCATION VoucIHRs 229-39; Areen, supra note 49, at 496-500.
70 See notes 33 & 66 supra.
71 School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). In those cases where
appropriations have been upheld, no such involvement was present. See, e.g., Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cochran
v. Louisiana, 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
72 See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
78 See EDUCATION VOUCHERs 233-37. This must be distinguished from the "secular cost"
approach to the "no proscribed benefit" theory, which would require continuous state
surveillance of private school expenditures and records. Id. at 237-39.
A variation on the secular value theory is suggested by Professor Choper. Choper,
The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 260, 287-90
(1968). In considering governmental financial assistance to parochial schools, he suggests
that it is
constitutional to the extent that it does not exceed the value of their secular
services. Whatever the incidental benefits to religious insitutions, the establishment
clause should be satisfied by ensuring that government receive secular returns
from those institutions commensurate with its financial expenditure.
Id. at 340.
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other words, if it could be determined, perhaps by standardized tests
in secular subjects, that a religious school was providing secular education equal to that of the public schools, then payments could be
said to have only a secular effect. 74 This would involve far less policing
on the part of the government, and might avoid the excessive entanglement proscribed in Walz and Lemon. However, even if the entanglement standard were met, in light of the Court's evasive language in
Lemon, it is by no means certain that such a plan would be able to
75
meet the primary effect test.
Once the legislature distinguishes between secular and sectarian
functions, and aid is directed only towards secular functions, the
policing required to maintain the separation threatens to entangle
the government excessively in religious affairs. Yet a program making
no distinction between the secular and sectarian activities of a church
related institution might well have a primary effect violative of the
first amendment. For private schools to survive, legislatures must break
this impasse and ensure that aid is channelled into secular activities
without necessitating extensive governmental surveillance. Tuition
voucher schemes attempt to avoid the "entanglement" of government
surveillance by relying on parental choice to channel block grants to
private schools, and to avoid a primary effect of aiding religion by
relying on the secular value theory. Before the system can pass constitutional muster the Court must accept this theory without requiring the
type of extensive proof that would again create excessive government
entanglement with religion. It remains for future court tests to deter7
mine the validity of this alternative.
74 See, e.g., Areen, Public Aid to Non-Public Schools: A Breach in the Sacred Wall?,
22 CASE W. RES. L. Rav. 230, 252-53 (1971).
75 The two legislatures [by passing "purchase-of-secular-services" legislation rather
than providing aid in another form], however, have also recognized that churchrelated elementary and secondary schools have a significant religious mission and
that a substantial portion of their activities is religiously oriented. They have
therefore sought to create statutory restrictions designed to guarantee the separation between secular and religious educational functions and to ensure that State
financial aid supports only the former .... We need not decide whether these
legislative precautions restrict the principal or primary effect of the programs to
the point where they do not offend the Religion Clauses....
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1971).
76 A review of some of the legal aspects of voucher systems may soon occur, as it is
reported that the American Civil Liberties Union has begun proceedings to attack a
Minnesota tax credit plan. N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1971, at 17, col. 2. See text accompanying
note 82 infra.
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B.

Private Enterprise and Education
Another educational trend which has been gaining attention is
performance contracting."77 Under this system, local schools contract
part of their teaching responsibilities to private companies. These
companies are paid according to the quality of the results they achieve,
as determined by the student's quantitative scores on tests. The system
is designed to overcome stagnation in the educational system by going
outside traditional structures. It is hoped that the introduction of the
profit motive into the classroom will give rise to a competitive educational structure that will in turn improve the quality of student performance. In the sense that performance contracting provides for
competition for the student's tuition, it is similar to the education
voucher scheme. At the present time experiments in performance
contracting are being conducted on a local level, sometimes aided by
federal subsidies. 78 If, in fact, such a scheme proves successful and
further efforts are made in this direction, the place of parochial schools
in a private, competitive system must be determined.
Ultimately, a system could be envisioned in which all educational
institutions are private, subject only to government certification of
minimum standards, and compete for the tuition payments of students.
If one accepts the role played by the parochial school system in the
realm of private and, indeed, secular education-as the Court did in
Allen-and the right of a parent to have his child attend a parochial
77 Although this approach to education is relatively undeveloped, a number of large
firms such as RCA and McGraw-Hill have begun work on such contracts. N.Y. Times,
Jan. 11, 1971, at 68, col. 5. On the whole, however, reaction from industry is mixed.
Schwartz, Performance Contracting: Industry's Reaction, NATION'S SCHOOLS, Sept. 1970,
at 53.
The world of private enterprise may not only provide the public school system with
innovative teaching techniques, but with managers as well. The U.S. Office of Education
has funded a project called National Program of Education Leadership. This program
seeks to bring noneducators into the field of education at the executive level, in order
to effect changes in the public school system. Jenkins, Schools Look Afield for Fresh
Managers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971, at 69, col. 1.
78 The Office of Economic Opportunity plans to test the program with a $6.5 million
contract involving 21 school districts. Schwartz, Performance Contracts Catch On, NATION'S
ScsooLs, Aug. 1970, at 31.
In Gary, Indiana, for example, a private firm has contracted with the public school
system to operate an elementary school for four years. The company receives from the
city the annual cost of educating these students ($800 per pupil per year). Under the
agreement, the company agrees to "bring the students' achievement scores up to or above
the national grade level norms in all basic curriculum areas or refund to the city the
fees paid for each child who does not attain those levels." N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971, at 68,
cols. 6-7. For the results of this experiment, see note 100 infra.
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school-as the Court did in Pierce v. Society of Sisters79-then

paro-

chial schools should have a place in such a system. Considering the
negligible government entanglement, constitutional barriers similar
to those potentially involved within tuition voucher schemes may not
arise, even though some government funds would inevitably end up
aiding religious educational activities in parochial schools.8 0
C.

Tax Aid to Families with Parochial School Students

An approach that would eliminate cash payments, denounced in
Lemon, and take advantage of the Supreme Court's approval of tax
exemptions in Walz, is the tax credit plan. This approach would grant
tax benefits to parents of private school children. 8 ' Such a plan has
been enacted in Minnesota, where parents of private school students
can deduct educational expenses from their state income taxes. If their
"19 268 Us. 510 (1925). In striking down a statute which made attendance in public
schools compulsory, and upholding the right of a parent to send his child to a private
or parochial school, the Court stated that "the power of the State to provide public
schools carries with it no power to prohibit and suppress private schools and colleges which

are competent and qualified to afford what the State wants, namely, education." Id. at 519

(emphasis added). The Court restated its position with respect to parochial schools in
Allen: "[The continued willingness to rely on private school systems, including parochial
systems, strongly suggests that a wide segment of informed opinion, legislative and otherwise, has found that those schools do an acceptable job of providing secular education
to their students." Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 247-48 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
See also, State v. Yoder, 49 Wis. 2d 480, 182 N.W.2d 539 (1971), cert. granted, 402 U.S. 994
(1971) (No. 70-110).
One argument, which has thus far been omitted from this discussion, is that denial

of financial aid to parochial schools is a violation of the equal protection clause. This could
be based on the Supreme Court's opinion in Pierce that parents have the right to send
their children to a parochial school that meets state standards. "According to this argument, parochial schools are in a different category from any other function of a church
because of the fact that the church has been allocated a public duty to perform in the
area of primary education." Kurland, Politics and the Constitution: FederalAid to Parochial Schools, 1 LAND & WATER L. REv. 475, 491 (1966). See Drinan, The Constitutionality
of Public Aid to ParochialSchools, in THE WALL BETWEN CMisrcH AND STATE 55 (D. Oaks
ed. 1968). Compare Freund, Public Aid to ParochialSchools, 82 HAMv. L. Rv. 1680 (1969)
with Valente &-Stanmeyer, Public Aid to ParochialSchools-A Reply to Professor Freund,
59 Gao. L.J. 59 (1970).

80 See notes 67-76 and accompanying text supra. A tuition voucher system involving
private, profit making Achools might strengthen the constitutional merits of the secular
value theory. However, if each school is required to provide a certain minimum amount
of secular education, any funds remaining above the cost to the institution of secular
education would constitute profit, to be used in any manner the school considers desirable.
Theoretically, a parochial school would be able to devote this money to religious instruction. See EDucATIoN Voucaus 233-34. Such a benefit to the church schools, however,
would go far beyond the "inddental benefit" realized in Everson and Allen.
81 The President's Panel on Non-Public Education is considering such an approach.
N.Y. Times, Aug. 26, 1971, at 1, col. 7.
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school bills exceed their tax bills, the state will issue a rebate up to
a maximum of one hundred dollars.8 2
In Walz, the Supreme Court held that tax exemptions for church
owned property were constitutionally permissible. Such exemptions
were intended to "... confine rather than enlarge the area of permissible state involvement with religious institutions,"88 and to foster
government neutrality towards religion. The government's involvement in Walz-the continuing burden of ensuring that tax exempt
property is used for religious worship-was considered less entangling
than administration of taxes.
Here, however, the choice for states would be between extending
a tax deduction or rebate to parents of parochial school children or
maintaining the status quo which involves no entanglement with
church schools. Since nonpublic schools would have to be brought
into the administrative processes of government in order to validate
the tax deductions claimed by parents of parochial school students,
the scheme may foster excessive government entanglement with
religious affairs. In addition, these benefits are extended solely to
taxpayers with private school expenditures, thereby raising doubts
as to whether the legislation has a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion. Such a system would not be analogous to
tax deductions for charitable contributions, where the donor has
complete freedom of choice as to the recipient of his funds, secular
or religious, educational or otherwise.8 4
D.

Government Scholarships for Private School Students

Another proposal, recently adopted in Maryland, provides for
scholarship grants to children in nonpublic schools.8 5 Like the "purchase-of-secular-services" statutes, this proposal only involves private
schools and, indeed, can be thought of as a voucher program confined
to the private sector. A similar plan has recently been enacted in
Pennsylvania to replace the "purchase-of-secular-services" plan ruled
unconstitutional in Lemon.88
82 Act of June 7, 1971, ch. 944, [1971] Minn. Laws 1596; see N.Y. Times, Aug. 26,
1971, at 17, col. 1.
83 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
84 See Areen, supra note 49, at 494. See generally Note, Public Aid to Private Education, 20 CATH. U.L. REv. 528, 533 (1971).
85 The scholarships range in value from $75 to $200, depending upon family income.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §§ 213-70 (Supp. 1971).
88 N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1971, at 27, col. 1. Under the Pennsylvania plan, parents of
private school students receive payments of $75 for an elementary school pupil and $150
for a secondary school student.

1972]

PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS

"Government scholarship" plans are designed to keep the doors
of parochial schools open while avoiding the excessive entanglement
between government and religion condemned in Lemon. With respect
to the latter objective, these plans appear to be successful. Payment
of funds to parochial school parents involves none of the surveillance
required in the "purchase-of-secular-services" programs. As with the
tax credit plans, however, the parochial schools might be brought into
the administrative process insofar as to validate the scholarship claims
of parents. The first part of the Court's three-part test would be satisfied since the stated objective of such a plan would be to improve the
secular education generally, a purpose validated in Lemon.8 7 However,
these plans may fall prey to the second test; they may have a primary
effect which advances religion. Scholarship funds paid only to parochial school families would produce more than an incidental benefit
to church related institutions.
A modification of the traditional effect test, proscribing only those
activities which clearly tend to establish a religious belief and not
those which merely have the primary effect of advancing it, might
neutralize the threat the test poses to all the schemes heretofore discussed.8 8 Since the Lemon case was resolved on the entanglement issue,
the Court did not have an opportunity to deal with such a modified
approach. The Court should explore the manner in which the Alien
decision, which suggests that aid to secular activities might be constitutional, may be accommodated with the Walz decision, which proscribes excessive entanglement.
E. Shared Time
One approach to the problem of public aid to private schools, although by no means of recent origin, is the "shared time" program.
Under such a system, private school students would attend public
schools for part of the day in order to obtain instruction in one or
more secular courses. This approach has not been tested in the Supreme Court,8 9 nor does it provide a complete solution to the financial
403 US. 602, 613 (1971).
"This modification of the Allen test proscribes not government acts which 'advance'
but only those which 'establish' religious belief, a more pragmatic and seemingly less
onerous standard." Areen, supra note 74, at 240.
89 The Michigan Supreme Court recently considered the constitutionality of shared
time programs. An amendment to the Michigan constitution prohibited the use of public
monies for any school which offered instruction to nonpublic school students. This
clause was held violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
in contravention of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Although shared time
programs were upheld, the court emphasized the need for strict controls in the imple87
88
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problems of the parochial schools. Programs such as this, however, do
provide the parochial schools with a method whereby they may maintain an input into the educational process while remaining within
first amendment confines.
The Supreme Court, in Zorach v. Clauson, 0° found a New York
"released time" program constitutional. Under this plan, students were
allowed to leave public schools and attend sectarian institutions for
religious instruction. The Court based its decision on the grounds that
neither public funds nor public schools were used in the program,
and that the purpose was merely to accommodate the schools' schedule
to the religious needs of the populace. 91 A "shared time" approach,
in which private school students receive some secular instruction,
would greatly burden the public schools. However, the burdens that
will be placed upon public schools if parochial schools cease to function entirely would be considerably greater. Such an approach provides
a realistic alternative for religious schools at a time when hard economics threaten their continued operation.
III
REFORM IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Many difficulties that plague parochial schools are not unique,
and apply to the public school system as well. The crisis in education
presents financial, ideological, administrative, and legal problems.
Funds for education have become more difficult to obtain, and the
very structure of public school finance has been challenged as inadequate. 2 Perhaps most important, however, has been the growth of a
mentation of such plans. In re Proposal C, 384 Mich. 890, 185 N.W.2d 9 (1971); 49
J. UB. L. 175 (1971).
In Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948), the Court examined
a statute which presented a related issue. The statute allowed public school pupils to be
released with parental consent from secular education classes in order to attend religious
classes on the school premises. The Court held the statute unconstitutional as violative of
the establishment clause of the first amendment. Since the state required attendance
in either secular or religious classes, the state was compelling religious instruction in the
public schools.
90 343 US. 306 (1952).
91 This approach has gained added strength through its inclusion in the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, § 205(a)(2), 20 US.C. § 241e(a)(2) (1970). Its continued use has met with some success. See, e.g., Byrne, A Report on Shared Time, in
TRENDS AN ISSUES IN CATHOLIC EDUCATION, supra note 3, at 220, 220-31; Choper, supra
note 73, at 335-37; Note, Shared Time: Indirect Aid to ParochialSchools, 65 MIcH. L. REV.
1224 (1967).
92 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971); note 46
supra. See Malcolm, Shift of Tax Burden Sought, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971, at 67, col. 5.
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"full-bodied movement for the reform and restructuring of education
in the United States. ' 93 Arguments that American schools bore and
stifle students and fail to educate them adequately are being voiced by
parents, students, and educators alike. 94 The movement for educational
reform is somewhat unique, however, in that it is not burdened with
an attitude of despair. On the contrary, the majority of critics, while
recognizing that there are tremendous inadequacies in the present approach to education, agree that effective reform is both practical and
possible, and are excited by the potential offered by America's educational resources.9 5 It is this attitude that has led to proposals and
experiments, some of which have been discussed herein, which seek
96
to improve the quality of education offered by American schools.
93 Stevens, Reform Drive Now Key Issue in Education, N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1971, at

47, col. 3.
94 Dr. Harvey Scribner, Chancellor of the public school system of New York City,
recognized the almost universal acceptance of a need for education reform when he
remarked:
[M]any other troubles-of an educational nature-will remain until the schools
begin to reshape themselves in a number of fundamental ways.
Basic change in the style and content of the schools-in the way education is
defined, measured and packaged-is imperative. On that, there is relatively little
disagreement.
Scribner, Restructuring Deemed an Urban "Imperative," id. at col. 4. See A. Eumicn, REFORMING AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE INNOVATIVE APPROACH TO IMPROVING OUR SCHOOLS AND

COLLEGES (1969); C. SILBERMAN, CRISIS IN THE CLASSROOM: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN
EDUCATION (1970). For an excellent study of the current "academic revolution" in higher
education, see C. JENCKS & D. RIEsmN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION (1968).
95 The potential for effective reform is evident in the following remarks:
Because adults take the schools so much for granted, they fail to appreciate
what grim, joyless places most American schools are, how oppressive and petty
are the rules by which they are governed, how intellectually sterile and esthetically
barren the atmosphere, what an appalling lack of civility obtains on the part of
teachers and principals, what contempt they unconsciously display for children as
children.
And it need not bel Public schools can be organized to facilitate joy in
learning and esthetic expression and to develop character-in the rural and urban
slums no less than in the prosperous suburbs. This is no utopian hope; . . .
there are models now in existence that can be followed.
C. SILBERMAN, supra note 94, at 10 (emphasis in original).
Speaking of reform in higher education, Jencks and Riesman conclude:
Aside from nuclear war or a wave of national repression brought on by
racial conflict or the defeat of imperial ambitions, generational conflict seems to be
the major threat to the stability and growth of the academic system. Whether
such conflict will lead to short-run reforms is doubtful. But in the long run the
young always displace the old, and they seldom completely resemble them. If they

are a different breed, and if they want to build a different world ...

they can do

SO.
C. JENCKS & D. RmSMAN, supra note 94, at 543.
96 The real difficulty lies in the need to overcome traditional opposition to change,

and to create an innovative atmosphere.
The key to reforming American education is new ideas: new ideas to challenge
educational dogmas; new ideas to stimulate change; new ideas to suggest lines of
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CONCLUSION

Although the financial consequences of the elimination of parochial schools are awesome, these fiscal considerations cannot serve to
justify a violation of first amendment prohibitions. The Supreme Court
will undoubtedly be afforded an opportunity to examine the proposals
being advanced as constitutional alternatives for parochial schools,
and thus to supply some answers as to the future viability of a religious
school system.97 But the parochial schools themselves must reevaluate
their role in our educational system. Future court decisions may so
severely and unequivocally restrict public aid that parochial schools
will have to seek alternative methods of contributing to the educational
process. "Shared" and "released time" programs are such alteinatives.9 8 The churches should examine others so that they may be
able to adjust to possible hard times.
Perhaps the greatest burden rests with American educators in the
public sector. It will be their responsibility to develop new and innovative reforms in education. The demise of the parochial school
system would eliminate a source of cultural diversity and competition.
Many alternatives which have been advanced to revive the parochial
schools, such as the tuition voucher scheme, may offer vast improveresearch and development. And back of these new ideas a total innovative approach
which asks constantly: Why? ...

New ideas are the key to educational reform. But public policy for education
in the United States has not developed in such a way as to support innovation
and change. We have simply not organized our educational enterprise to
encourage rapid progress. This failure must be examined if we are to present
an honest picture of the obstacles to reform.
A. EuRiCH, supra note 94, at 18. (emphasis in original).
97 Although litigation concerning public aid to parochial schools has traditionally
focused on the establishment clause, the potential elimination of parochial schools may
shift the emphasis to the free exercise clause. It may be argued that, in order to accommodate the religious needs of society, a church school system is constitutionally required as a form of free exercise of religious beliefs. See note 79 supra.
There is evidence of this trend in a recent decision construing Missouri law. Parents
of private school children argued that the Missouri constitutional ban on the use of
public funds for sectarian purposes rendered the choice between private and public
schools meaningless and therefore violated the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
The court, relying in part on the recent Supreme Court decision in Lemon, held that
a parent's right to send his children to a private school cannot be equated with a right
to obtain financial assistance from the state for private religious education. Brusca v.
Missouri, 332 F. Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
98 The closing of the parochial high school in Bennington, Vermont, led to such a
program. An ecumenical group of clergymen took advantage of a released time program
to offer elective courses on topical issues with a religious emphasis to high school students.
Such an approach constitutes a refreshing and potentially successful source of religious
input into traditional secular education. Tims, July 12, 1971, at 37.
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ments over present policies even without parochial school participation. 99 These programs are certainly worthy of testing, 10 0 and the first
amendment should not constitute a barrier to such experimentation.
Successful resolution of the crisis in education requires that educators
look beyond the confines of traditional structures and search for new
and better ways in which to allocate our educational resources.
Thomas E. Willett
99 See EnuCATION VOUCHeRS 136.
100 Testing with respect to performance contracting may have pointed out some of
the deficiencies connected with such an approach. A publication of the New York State
Teachers' Association reports that an experiment with performance contracting in Virginia
brought rather poor results. An independent contractor undertook to teach reading skills
to some 2400 Virginia school children in grades two through seven. Studies conducted after
the course was completed revealed that one-third of the children either slipped backward
or made no gain in achievement. Based on these scores, Virginia paid the contractor $35
per pupil less than the firm would have received in the event of successful completion
of the program. THE CHALLENGER, Sept. 3, 1971, at 3, col. 1.
The results in Gary, Indiana were more promising. Recent test scores showed that
almost 73%. of students participating in the performance contracting program had reached
or exceeded national levels in reading or math. Prior to the program, only one out of four
students was reading at the national level. Although -many questions remained, school
officials thought the initial results were encouraging. TimE, Oct. 11, 1971, at 78.

